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REVELATION AND INSPIRATION: 
THE LIBERAL MODEL 
FERNANDO L. CANALE 
Andrews University 
The purpose of this article is to describe the broad characteristics 
of the liberal model of revelation-inspiration as it relates to the epis- 
temological origin of Holy Scripture and evaluate it along with the 
classical model described in my earlier article.' The question before us 
still is the same that prompted the analysis of the classical model: Is a 
new theoretical interpretation of the epistemological origin of Scripture 
necessary? Would it not be more practical and effective to choose one 
of the many available interpretations? 
Philosophical and cultural developments of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries led to the formulation of a new approach to bibli- 
cal interpretation, namely the historical-critical method. According to 
Gerhard Ebeling, this method, along with its corresponding model of 
revelation-inspiration, attained "well-nigh undisputed dominancen 
already during the second half of the nineteenth ~ e n t u r y . ~  This I 
referred to earlier as the "liberal (encounter-existential)" model. We must 
 ernan an do L. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," AUSS 32 
(1994): 7-28. 
2~erha rd  Ebeling, Word and Faith (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963), 18. Even though 
the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation was a product of the Enlightenment 
(see Gerhard Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, rev. ed. 
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19771, 18-23), its development did not require a new model of 
revelation-inspiration (cf. Hug, 14-15). Critical evaluation of the historical-critical method 
must be developed on the level of philosophical presuppositions. To note, as did Eta 
Linneman, that the method works "as if there were not God," bringing the Bible to the 
same level as other human literary productions, or that it lets everyday experience deter- 
mine what is reality and what is not, cannot suffice (Historical Criticism of the Bible 
Methodology or Ideology? [Grand Rapids: Baker, 19901, 84, 88). These characteristics, true 
though they may be, stand on the basis of (1) carefully developed philosophical principles 
and (2) a new way of understanding revelation-inspiration. If the historical-critical method 
is to be challenged, more than a mere return to the classic interpretation of the presuppo- 
sitional structure and a moderate view of verbal inspiration (ibid., 144) is required. 
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now turn our attention to its presuppositional structures and the 
specific elements that characterize it.3 
1 .  Presuppositional Structure of the Libmal Model 
During the Enlightenment period, new philosophical trends began 
to criticize, challenge, modify, and replace some of the basic principles 
on which the classical interpretation of the presuppositional structure 
were grounded. Following Ren6 Descartes' turn to the subject, classical 
realism was rejected and replaced by different forms of idealism. More 
significant, however, was the epistemology's radical departure from 
intellectualism. Reason was reinterpreted by limiting its reach to the 
space-time continuum. 
Immanuel Kant, reinterpreting reason, argued that the intellect did 
not have the capability of reaching into the timeless nature of ultimate 
reality (essence or second ~ u s i a ) . ~  Since for classical theology, ultimate 
reality in nature and supernature was timeless, Kant's limitation of 
reason's power to the realm of spatio-temporal reality deprived the 
Classical Model of revelation-inspiration of its basic ground. As stated 
by Hendrikus Berkhof, Kant's foundational work also constituted "a 
radical new beginning for evangelical theology. As a result of its 
appearance, orthodox scholasticism, rationalism, and supernaturalism 
found that at a single stroke, the road forward had been blocked." 
Furthermore, Kant's philosophical structure required "the modern way 
of posing questions, and modern methodology, in the~logy."~ His 
3 ~ o r m a n  L. Geisler identifies and discusses Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, 
Benedict Spinoza, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant as contributors in the development 
of the new philosophical ideas that lie at the basis of the liberal conception of revelation- 
inspiration ("Philosophical Presuppositions of Biblical Errancy," in Inerrancy, ed. Norman 
L. Geisler [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 19791, 312-327). William Nix, working with trends 
rather than philosophers, identifies pietism, deism, materialism, naturalism, skepticism, 
agnosticism, romanticism, idealism, and existentialism as ideological trends that lead to 
liberal theology ("The Doctrine of Inspiration since the Reformation, Part 11: Changing 
Climates of Opinion," JETS 27 [1984]: 441-456). He concludes that "between the early 
seventeenth and early twentieth centuries a series of changes in the climates of opinion 
gradually pre ared the gound for a direct and open confrontation between religion and 
science over rRe issues of revelation, inspiration and the authority of Scripture" (457). 
4~mmanuel Kant, Critzque of Pure Reason (London: J .  M .  Dent and Sons, 1939), 54. 
5~endrikus Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology Report of a Personal Journey, 
tr. by John Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans, 1989), 1-2. For an introduction to 
Kant's thought specifically written for theologians see Royce Gordon Gruenler, Meaning 
and Understanding: f ie  Philosophical Framework for Biblical Intwpretation, Foundations 
of Contemporary Interpretation Series, 2 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), 35-45; Stanley 
Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century 7heology: God and the WorM in a Transitional 
Age [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 19921, 26-31; and Berkhof, 1-18. 
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philosophy includes, on one hand, the timeless nature of God and his 
truth, which is still uncritically accepted, and on the other hand, the 
limitation of man's reason to the spatio-temporal realm that does not 
allow for cognitive contact between man's reason and a timeless or 
supernatural object. The result of Kant's epistemological revolution was 
the conclusion that cognitive revelation of supernatural truths is 
impossible. Moreover, neither natural theology nor metaphysics, with 
their proofs of God's existence, could be fitted into this new philosoph- 
ical interpretation of the presuppositional structure. Briefly put, the 
'Copernican revolution" produced by Kant occurred within the episte- 
mological rather than the ontological realm. The existence of God and 
of the human soul are maintained, as is the classical timeless interpreta- 
tion of their natures; what is disavowed in Kant's epistemological 
revolution is the possibility for a cognitive communication between 
God and man6 
2. Revelation in the Liberal Model 
Kantian epistemology, when accepted, seems to render impossible 
any attempt to explain revelation. Since Christian theology has rather 
uncritically assumed that the role of extra-biblical philosophy in 
theology is to provide the interpretation of the presuppositional 
structure required for its development, Kant's revolution became a 
challenge that Christian theology, sooner or later, had to evaluate. The 
problem consisted, basically, in the fact that philosophy was criticizing 
and reinterpreting its classical views. Christian theology is still faced 
with the same question: Which interpretation of the presuppositional 
structure should be chosen? The choice cannot be made on rational 
absolute grounds, but rather in terms of preferences or traditions. Those 
who still believe that the classical interpretation of the presuppositional 
structure is to be chosen become "conservatives"; those who believe that 
the Kantian interpretation should be chosen became 'liberals." 
The first questions that a liberal theologian must answer regard 
whether revelation-inspiration is possible and what is its nature. 
Moreover, the place of Scripture as source of theology also needs 
clarification. Is it possible, then, to accept the new Kantian definition 
of the presuppositional structure and at the same time to claim the 
possibility and existence of divine revelation? 
 ant, Critique of Pure Reason, 46. "Kant, the greatest philosopher of the 
movement, denied the very possibility of factual knowledge concerning a super-sensible 
order, and this appeared to seal the fate of the historic doctrine of revelation" (James I. 
Packer, "Contemporary Views of Revelation," 92). See also Carl F. Henry, "Divine 
Revelation," 261, 267. 
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Friedrich Schleierrnacher, "the father of Modern Theology," under- 
took the difficult task of creating a new conception of revelation on the 
basis of Kant's rejection of classical intellectualism.' Schleiermacher not 
only provided the new model, but also developed it in a technical 
fashion that is still at the foundation of the many ways in which 
revelation has been interpreted within the tradition of liberal theology.8 
On the foundation laid by Schleierrnacher, other theologians 
contributed both to the formulation and increasing popularity of the 
liberal model of revelation and inspiration, among then notably Rudolf 
Otto, Martin Buber, Emil Brunner, and Karl Ba~-th.~ We must now 
query what are the main features of the liberal model of the epistemo- 
logical origin of Scripture as expressed by Schleierrnacher, Otto, Buber, 
Brunner, and Barth. No attempt to develop in depth the doctrine of 
these representatives of the liberal model is attempted. Our search is 
rather for the basic structure of the model they all represent." 
Divine Activity 
The liberal model of revelation-inspiration does not challenge or 
change the classical understanding of God." God is still conceived to be 
'For an introduction to Schleiermacher's thought, see Richard R. Niebuhr, 
"Friedrich Schleiermacher," in A Handbook of Christian Theologians, enlarged edition, ed. 
Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 17-35; Schleiermacher 
on Christ and Religion (New York: Scribner's, 1964); and Keith Clements, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher: Pioneer of Modern Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1987). 
8The central role played by Schleiermacher as the founder of the liberal model of 
theology is underlined, for instance, by Gnuse, 9; Abraham, "Inspiration, Revelation and 
Divine Action: A Study in Modern Methodist Theology," 47; and Packer, "Contemporary 
Views of Revelation," 92. 
9~ am aware that in his Church Dogmatics (CD), Barth consciously attempted to 
depart from liberal theology as conceived by Schleiermacher. For instance, Barth explicitly 
rejected the specific way in which Schleiermacher explained some aspects of the human 
contribution in the epistemological origin of Scripture (W, I/1, 126). His theological 
approach departs from Schleiermacherian liberal theology in substantial aspects and 
properly deserves the designation Neo-Orthodox. However different Barth's and Brunner's 
general approaches to theology may be from those of 18th- and 19th-century liberal 
theologies on the issue of the epistemological origin of Scripture, the differences do not 
seem to reveal a different model but rather a more complete and explicit formulation of 
the liberal model originated by Schleiermacher. 
lo~egarding the way in which the idea of "theological model" is utilized in this 
article see Canale, 8-10. 
 lato to's two-world theory can be detected at the base of the liberal model of theol- 
ogy. Regarding Plato's influence on Schleiermacher's thought, see, e.g., Terrence N. Tice, 
"Introduction," in On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, by Friedrich Schleier- 
macher, tr. Richard Crouter (Cambridge, Engl.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 25. 
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"absolutely timeless."12 Divine activity, consequently, is understood to 
operate within the timeless level of reality. "By the Eternity of God," 
Schleiermacher states, "we understand the absolutely timeless causality 
of God, which conditions not only all that is temporal but time itself 
as well."13 The way in which the Bible presents God's causality within 
history cannot be integrated by the presuppositonal structure of the 
liberal model. This is why Schleiermacher remarks that "divine causality 
is only equal in compass to the finite in so far as it is opposite to it in 
kind, since if it were like it in kind, as it is often represented as being 
in anthropomorphic ideas of God, it too would belong to the sphere of 
interaction and thus be a part of the totality of the natural order."14 
Yet, divine activity "extends as widely as the order of nature and the 
finite causality contained in it." Applying this concept of divine activity 
rigorously, Schleiermacher concludes that God's creation "must be 
represented as the event in time which conditions all change," yet, must 
do so without making "the divine activity itself a temporal activity."15 
Consequently, any idea that may suggest a temporal sequence in God's 
activity must be consistently eliminated.16 This is the kind of divine 
activity that generates revelation. 
Rudolf Otto strengthened Schleiermacher's view by emphasizing 
the otherness of the reality causing revelation in man. This objective 
reality, which tradition calls God, Otto designates as the "numinous."17 
This "numinous" objective reality "outside the self* is qualified as 
"Mysterium Tremend~m."'~ "Mysterium" means in a pure negative sense 
"that which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and 
unfamiliar."19 "Tremendum" means "absolute unapproachability" and 
"absolute overpoweringness."20 Moreover, the "numinous" is character- 
12~here is no doubt that Schleiermacher subscribed to the absolute timelessness of 
God. In this regard, see his brief but clear and well-articulated presentation (The Christian 
Faith, tr. from the 2d German ed. (1830) by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart 
(Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark. 1928), § 52, 1-2 and postscript. 
16see, e.g., ibid., § 42.1-2. 
"~udolf  Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inqtriry into the Non-Rational Factor in the 
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Ratiml,  tr. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford, 
1923), 11. 
174 FERNANDO L. CANALE 
ized as the "'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommen- 
surable with our own."21 Otto and Barth understand the divine as that 
reality which absolutely differs from nature and humanity. In so doing 
they not only assume the traditional conception of the timelessness of 
God but bring it to its most extreme expression. As in the case of 
Schleiermacher, Otto's "numinous wholly other" cannot act historically 
in history but only as the transcendent cause of human religious 
experiences. 
Buber interprets the whole of reality in relational terms. I-it refers 
to the nonrelational world of things in nature and history.22 I-thou 
refers to the world of relations.23 "The world of It is set in the context 
of space and time. The world of 7bou is not set in the context of either 
of these."24 Knowledge and words belong to the world of It.25 What 
man in the world of It (knowledge) calls God, Otto identifies in the 
world of reality (ontology) as the Eternal  tho^.'^ Buber not only 
affirms the timeless nature of the Eternal Thou but, agreeing with Otto 
and Barth, understands Him as the absolutely transcendent wholly 
other.27 This God does not act historically in history. To act historically 
in history corresponds to Buber's nonpersonal world of It. God's 
action is directly consummated in our own I through the mediation of 
the BOU of all beings.28 In other words God acts "personally" in the 
2 2 " ~ s  experience, the world belongs to the primary word I-it" (Martin Buber, I a d  
Thou, tr. Ronald Gregor Smith [New York: Scribner's, 19371, 6). "The history of the 
individual and that of the human race, in whatever they may continually part company, 
agree at least in this one respect, that they indicate a progressive augmentation of the 
world of It" (ibid., 31). 
23"The primary word I-Thou establishes the world of relation" (ibid., 6). According 
to Buber the I-Thou world of relations includes three spheres: nature, humankind, and 
intelligible forms (ibid). God, being the Eternal Thou, does not belong to the world of 
relation but as the Wholly Other is the transcendent cause of all relations and the world 
of "It" as well. 
24~bid., 33 and 100. 
27~bid., 79. This absolute transcendence of God's being includes the closeness of real 
immanence to the point that panentheistic overtones seem to be at least implied in Buber's 
concept of God as Eternal Thou. Consider for instance the following statement: "Of 
course God is the 'wholly Other'; but He is also the wholly Same, the wholly Present. 
Of course He is the Mysterium Tremendum that appears and overthrows; but He is also 
the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than my I" (ibid.). 
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timeless dimension of the 'Ilbou. As will be seen below under the essence 
of revelation, "personal" refers to something that occurs logically on an 
existential (ontic) noncognitive level prior to its presence on the 
cognitive level of which it is the objective cause. 
Emil Brunner, following Buber's analysis, also understands God as 
"pure 'Thou,'"29 as "absolute Subject."" Even though rejecting a timeless 
interpretation of God in a Platonic sense, Brunner is still unable to 
overcome the traditional timeless interpretation of God's eternity.)' For 
God, says Brunner, "the temporal-the separation into past, present, and 
future-do[es] not exist."32 In this context God's revelatory activity is 
conceived to have "always and everywhere the character of a sudden 
event. It stands out from all ordinary happenings, from the 'normal' 
course of development, and is a kind of 'incursion from another 
dimension.'"" 
Barth understands God's being as act rather than e~sence.'~ But act 
is not to be understood as something analogous to our human  action^.'^ 
God conceived as act or event expresses the conception that God is an 
ontic reality grounded not in an eternal essence but rather in his eternal 
28"~very particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of 
every particular Thou the primary word addresses the eternal Thou. Through this 
mediation of the 7hou of all beings fulfilment, and non-fulfilment, of relations comes to 
them: the inborn Thou is realised in each relation and consummated in none. It is 
consummated only in the direct relation with the Thou that by its nature cannot become 
Itn (ibid., 75). 
2 9 ~ m i l  Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, tr. Amandus W. Loos (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1943), 87. 
)O"~ut God is not a Person, but Person, absolutely; not a Subject but absolute 
subject" (Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith and 
Knowledge, rr. Olive Wyon [Philadelphia: Westminster, 19461, 24). 
31~mil  Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1949), 266-270. 
32~bid., 270. It should be noticed to his credit, however, that Brunner's concept of 
God's eternity comes very close to the biblical historical temporal concept. However, the 
specific rejection of temporal succession of past, present, and future in the divine life 
contradicts Scripture and flows from the Platonic tradition he is trying to overcome. 
Systematically, however, Brunner seems only to m o w  rather than overcome the 
timelessness of the classical conception of God's being and eternity. 
33~runner, Revelation and Reason, 30. 
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decision to be what he is.36 This act or event includes at the same time 
God's being and his works.37 The concept of revelation in Barth is 
necessarily tied to the concept of God as act. "God is who He is in the 
act of His revelation."" Because he is an act, God is a person who 
realizes and unites in himself "the fullness of all being."39 In a very real 
sense, then, God's act includes and causes not only himself but also the 
entire universe of nature and history." In short, "God exists in His act. 
God is His own decision. God lives from and by Himself."" In a true 
systematic fashion Barth immediately adds that "whatever else we may 
have to say must always correspond to this first definiti~n."~' 
Furthermore, according to Barth this act or event who is God in 
his revelation has been "executed once for all in eternity."" Barth has 
wrestled extensively with the issue of God's eternity. He has attempted, 
as has Brunner in a less technical and detailed way, to bring time into 
the eternal act that is God. Barth is aware that an explanation of the 
historicity of the cross is to be provided while at the same time leaving 
undisturbed the traditional idea of God's timeless eternity. He discusses 
the issue extensi~ely.~ Barth's position is only a minor modification of 
the traditional timeless conception of God embraced notably by 
Boethius and Thomas Aquinas." He declares that eternity is not 
simplicity that excludes the complexities and manifoldness of time (past, 
present, and future) and space, but on the contrary it includes in itself 
the complexity of time but in a simultaneous way.& The succession of 
36"The fact that God's being is event, the event of God's act, necessarily (if when 
we speak of it, we turn our eyes solely on His revelation) means that it is His own 
conscious, willed and executed decision" (ibid., 271). 
#see for instance W, II/l, 608-677. 
46"The being is eternal in whose duration beginning, succession and end are not 
three but one, not separate as a first, a second and a third occasion, but one simultaneous 
occasion as beginning, middle and end. Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle 
and end, and to that extent it is pure duration. Eternity is God in the sense in which in 
himself and in all things God is simultaneous, i.e., beginning and middle as well as end, 
without separation, distance or contradiction. Eternity is not, therefore, time, although 
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time (past, present, and future), therefore, is still denied to the being and 
act of God and his revelation. Thus, the basic ontological feature that 
characterizes the very essence of a timeless interpretation of God's being 
is still maintained by Barth. God's act of revelation, therefore, will not 
occur in the order df succession of our time but rather in th; order of 
the simultaneity of his eternity. As we will see later under content of 
revelation, even the central event of Jesus Christ actually occurs in 
God's (simultaneous time) rather than in our time. 
~t this point variations between these main representatives of the 
liberal model seem minimal. They do, however, set the stage for more 
significant variations at the level of human activity and thi content of 
revelation. 
Human Activity 
The main reason for the existence of a liberal model of revelation- 
inspiration is epistemological (interpretation of reason), rather than 
ontological (interpretation of the being of God or man). The liberal 
model of revelation replaces the classical interpretation of reason as 
being the active intellect capable, with supernatural help, of reaching 
into the timeless level of eternal divine truth, for with Kant's interpreta- 
tion, reason is limited to the temporal-spatial realm. Truth about God, 
says Schleiermacher, "could not proceed outwardly from any fact, and 
even if it did in some incomprehensible way come to a human soul, it 
could not be apprehended b; that soul, and retained as a thought; and 
if it could not be in any way perceived and retained, it could not 
become ~perative."~' It must also be remembered that Kant's interpreta- 
tion of human reason did not allow for the natural use of the active 
intellect. Thus, it follows that if Kant's transcendentalism is accepted, 
no room is allowed for the human intellect to be elevated in order to 
reach the timeless divine truth at a supernatural level. On the basis of 
this epistemological switch, revelation cannot be said to occur in the 
cognitive realm. Yet both Kant and Schleiermacher claim that, besides 
being capable of reason and action, the human soul has the capability 
of self-consciousness, that is, of a conscious awareness of itself.48 
time is certainly God's creation or more correctly, a form of His creation. Time is 
distinguished from eternity by the fact that in it beginning, middle and end are distinct 
and even opposed as past, present and future" (ibid., 608). 
47~chleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 5 10 postscript. 
48"~elf-consciousness" i  the technical term Schleiermacher uses to refer to feeling 
and piety (The Christian Faith, 5 3, 4, yet it is not synonymous with them. Specifically, 
Schleiermacher uses the term "self-consciousness" to avoid any use of "the word 'feeling' 
in a sense so wide as to include unconscious statesn (ibid.). See Grenz, 44. 
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Kant, speaking about aesthetics and art, defines feeling regarding 
sensory experiences as an inner modification in consciousness of the 
cognitive subject (self) about itself. The feeling experience gives rise to 
contents of pleasure and displeasure, and these form the basis for "a 
quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that contributes 
nothing to kn~wledge."'~ 
Schleiermacher and the liberal model of theology take Kant's 
concept of feeling and consider it as the technical, formal expression of 
the religious idea of piety. Specifically, religious feelings are said to 
occur in the area of human self-consciousness, which differs from 
knowledge in that it is totally passive.50 This is the area of the self in 
which religion and revelation occur, taking place when God, the 
Eternal, enters into an immediate relationship with the human being, 
thereby originating piety or the feeling of absolute dependence within 
human self-consciousness.51 
Otto, basically agreeing with Schleiermacher, points out that there 
must be a mental predisposition for revelation in man himself, "poten- 
tially present in the spirit as a dim or obscure a priori c~gni t ion ."~~ 
However, this priori required to contact the numinous wholly other is 
not reason but feeling, which Otto designates as "'creature-conscious- 
ness' or creature-feelingm5) The latter is basically defined as "the 
emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness 
in contrast to that which is supreme above all  creature^."^' 
Martin Buber analyzes the receptivity of man from the ontic rather 
than the epistemological perspective considered by Schleiermacher and 
Otto. Perception, knowledge, feeling, and imagination-according to 
Buber-belong to the realm of it, that is, to the realm of things in space 
4?Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Jdgment, tr. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1952), 42. 
50~chleiermacher, The Christian Faith, § 3, 3. 
"This happens directly in one's self-consciousness without the intervention of 
sensory perception or cognitive reason, and moreover the "self-identical essence of piety 
is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of 
being in relation to God" (see ibid., 5 4, 3). 
520tt0, The Idea of the Holy, 164. 
5 3 " ~ e  said above that the nature of the numinous can only be suggested by means 
of the special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling. 'Its nature is 
such that it grips or stirs the human mind with this and that determinate affective state'" 
(ibid., 12). 
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and time.55. The I-Thou world of timeless relation involves nature, men, 
and intelligible forms." Consequently, human beings possess the ontic 
capability for the existential encounter at the timeless level of the 
Eternal  tho^.^' Feelings play the same epistemological role but only as 
a "mere accompaniment to the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of 
the relation, which is fulfilled not in the soul but between I and 
Thou."58 The ontic receptivity of human existence emphasized by Buber 
harmonizes with the epistemological receptivity of feelings suggested by 
Schleiermacher and Otto. 
Emil Brunner identifies "faith" as the human reception of 
revelation. Faith is "first of all an act of knowledge."59 However, we are 
far from Aquinas's conception of faith residing in the intellect." 
According to Brunner, reason functions within the "I-it," nonpersonal 
dimension while faith works "in the 'I-Thou' dimension, as a perception 
of the way in which love is recognized in love, and not in any other 
way."ll So faith that receives revelation is an act of knowledge, not in 
the intellectual rational sense, but rather in the timeless existential 
personal sense. Brunner, then, understands faith as the human side of 
the divine-human existential personal encounter. "In faith I do not 
think, but God leads me to think; He does not communicate 'some- 
thing' to me, but 'Him~elf . '"~~ So faith is knowledge but of a different 
kind (personal-existential) which works within its own timeless level, 
whereas reason works within the space-temporal dimension and the 
subject-object structure of things ("I-It").63 Brunner disagrees with 
Schleiermacher, Otto, and Buber in seeing human reason, rather than 
feeling, as the cognitive capability that translates the personal existential 
5 5 u ~  perceive something. I am sensible to something. I imagine something. I will 
something. I feel something. I think something. The life of human beings does not consist 
of all this and the like alone. This and the like together establish the realm of Itn (ibid., 4). 
57uThe Thou meets me through grace-it is not found by seeking. But my speaking 
of the primary word to it is an act of my being, is indeed the act of my being. The Thou 
meets me. but I step into direct relation with it" (ibid., 11). 
59~runner, Revelation and Reason, 34. 
60~quinas, Surnnza theologica 2a-2ae, 4.2. 
61~bid., 36. 
62~runner, The Divine-Human Encounter, 85.  
63"~evealed knowledge is poles apart from rational knowledge. These two forms 
of knowledge are as far from each other as heaven is from earth" (Brunner, Revelation and 
Reason, 16). 
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content of revelation into knowledge and speech.64 It should be noticed 
here that Brunner seems to understand reason within the limits of 
Kant's epistemology rather than according to the interpretation of the 
Aristotelic-Thomistic tradition. 
Barth's position develops at great length and with detailed technical 
analysis a view in general similar to that of Brunner. However, he goes 
beyond Brunner in clearly rejecting the existence of an a priori natural 
capability of man for the reception of re~elation.~~. Barth affirms that 
God's act of revelation requires logically and necessarily a corresponding 
capability for such an act in man.66 However, in Barth's view God's act 
of revelation by itself simultaneously and miraculously creates in man 
the receptivity for revelation, namely faith.67 This existential and 
timeless encounter affects the whole being of men including his "will 
and conscience and feeling and all other anthropological  center^."'^ 
It seems clear that according to the liberal model, the human 
reception of God's timeless revelatory activity is displaced from reason 
to a supposed timeless depth of man's being. This existential (ontic) 
encounter indirectly also affects man's consciousness (epistemological 
level) either in the area of feeling and imagination or even in the realm 
of reason understood within the temporal limits expressed in Kant's 
epistemology. 
The Essence or Nature of Revelation 
Revelation, according to Schleiermacher, is a "divine and therefore 
eternal act."" Within a Kantian interpretation of the presuppositional 
structure, it is impossible to accept that God's revelatory activity 
operating "upon man as a cognitive beingm7' can become an important 
 h here is no human awareness corresponding to the divine utterance (CD V1, 149). 
"Where God speaks, it is meaningless to cast about for the corresponding act" (ibid., 162, 
224). 
67~arth  explains "that the possibility of knowing corresponding to the real Word 
of God has simply come to him, man, that it sets forth a quite inconceivable novum in 
direct contrast to all his ability and capacity, and is only to be regarded as a pure fact, like 
the Word of God itself" (ibid., 222). 
68~bid., 23 1. 
701bid., § 10 postscript. Here Schleiennacher's acceptance of Kant's epistemological 
theory can be detected. Religion does not belong either to the scientific or ethical realms 
(On Religion: Speeches to Its Culturad Despisers, tr. Richard Crouter [Cambridge, Engl.: 
Cambridge University Press, 19881, 77). Nash is correct in labeling this position 
REVELATION AND INSPIRATION: THE LIBERAL MODEL 181 
central feature of the liberal model of revelation-inspiration. If revelation 
cannot occur on the cognitive level, the only possible way to argue in 
favor of both the possibility and reality of divine revelation is to find 
in man a realm other than reason in which revelation would be possi- 
ble. This is precisely the key to the liberal model suggested by 
Schleiermacher. Divine revelation operates within the realm of man's 
feelings (piety) conceived as a faculty besides reason (science) and action 
(morals)." It can be clearly perceived that if God's eternal revelatory 
activity reaches human feelings, rather than human reason, it cannot 
communicate divine truths or propositions. According to the liberal 
model, divine revelation is possible and real. Yet, it produces no 
knowledge, information, meaning, or propositions, but rather a feeling 
of absolute dependence. God's action, then, appears only as the 
"whence" and the "co-determinant" of such a feeling." Schleiermacher 
has clearly summarized the liberal position regarding the essence of 
revelation and inspiration by remarking that "revelation is only to be 
assumed when not a single moment but a whole existence is determined 
by such a divine communication, and that what is then proclaimed by 
such an existence is to be regarded as revealed."73 
Otto follows Schleiermacher's epistemological approach rather than 
exploring the ontic existential foundation of such an epistemology of 
self-consciousness as the feeling of absolute dependence. According to 
Otto the essence of revelation consists in the human experience of the 
"numinous." 
As was already pointed out, the "numinous" is "mysterious." That 
the "numinous" we experience is "mysterious" means that it "is beyond 
our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge 
has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon some- 
thing inherently 'wholly other' whose kind and character are incom- 
mensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a 
wonder that strikes us chill and numb."" This experience, as in 
"theological agnosticism" (374), which is certainly a result of Kant's agnosticism. However, 
considering that agnosticism is the limitation of knowledge to a certain area rather than 
the total absence of knowledge, one could argue that the liberal model embraces an 
absolute form of theological agnosticism which amounts to systematic theological 
skepticism. 
71Schleiermacher, On Religion, 89-90. 
72~chleiermacher, The Christian Faith, § 4, 4. The consensus of liberal theologians 
during the last two centuries, that "God has not spoken, and indeed, cannot speakn (Nash, 
373), seems to be a consequence of Schleiermacher's interpretation of revelation. 
73~bid., § 10, postscript. 
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Schleiermacher, cannot produce knowledge but only "creature-feeling."75 
In a clear sense, then, Otto's view also proposes a noncognitive origin 
of revelation. 
According to Buber, revelation occurs as an existential encounter 
in the mutuality of the "I-Thoun relation. The essence of this encounter 
is that it connects the existence of God with the existence of man. That 
encounter occurs in the timelessness of the "I-Thou" relation. Conse- 
quently, in the encounter of revelation "man receives, and he receives 
no specific 'content' but a Presence, a Presence as power."" However, 
in the personal encounter "there is the inexpressible confirmation of 
meaning. Meaning is assured. Nothing can any longer be meaningle~s."~~ 
Yet this meaning received in the encounter cannot "be transmitted and 
made into knowledge generally current and admi~sible."~~ Buber's 
conception of the essence of revelation as noncognitive existential 
encounter is clearly visible in the following passage. 
That before which, in which, out of which, and into which we live, 
even the mystery, has remained what it was. It has become present 
to us and in its presentness has proclaimed itself to us as salvation; 
we have "known" it, but we acquire no knowledge from it which 
might lessen or moderate its mysteriousness.79 
In no uncertain terms Brunner agrees that in essence revelation is 
a noncognitive, non-historical, existential event that takes place at the 
the "I-Thoun level.80 
Karl Barth is also convinced that divine revelation is essentially a 
divine, personal, nnoncognitive nonhistorical event in the order of 
everyday temporal succe~sion.~~ However, Barth goes a step further in 
75 For "creature-feelingn to arise "there must be something 'numinous', something 
bearing the character of a 'numen', to which the mind turns spontaneously" (Otto, The 
Idea of the Holy, 1 1). 
76~uber,  I and Thou, 110. 
77~bid. 
instance, Brunner explains that "in dealing with genuine, primary faith, i.e., 
when God reveals Himself to me in His Word, we are not then concerned with a 
'something.' In His Word, God does not deliver to me a course of lectures in dogmatic 
theology, He does not submit to me or interpret for me the content of a confession of 
faith, but He makes Himself accessible to me" (The Divine-Human Encounter, 84, c.f. 87, 
89). See also idem, Revelation and Reason, 8, 27, 2830-3 1; and Theology of Crisis, 32-35. 
"1n its ultimate sense, *God's Word is not a thing to be described, nor is it a 
concept to be defined. It is neither a content nor an idea. It is not 'a truth,' not even the 
very highest truth. It is the truth because it is God's person speaking, Dei loquentis 
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claiming that the "Eternal Act of His Word" as it is spoken also 
includes and generates a historical "corespondent" in the created realm 
that always is co-given or accompanies the inner grounding revelatory 
spiritual act.82 This historical correspondent to the "Eternal Act of the 
Word of God," however, is not to be identified with the essence of 
Re~e la t ion .~~  Barth seems to introduce this variation in order to make 
room, within the liberal model of revelation, for the biblical claim that 
Jesus Christ is "the objective reality of revelation," in other words, that 
"according to Holy Scripture God's revelation takes place in the fact 
that God's Word became a man and that this man has become God's 
Word. The incarnation of the eternal Word, Jesus Christ, is God's 
revelation."" This historical correspondent plays a significant role in 
Barth's on the content of revelation which is discussed in our 
next section. 
By now the fact that the essence of the liberal model of revelation 
and inspiration does not belong to the realm of knowledge but rather 
to the inner realm of personal noncognitive encounter with God has 
become clear. Thus, the divine-human encounter which constitutes the 
essence of revelation takes place within the realm of man's self- 
consciousness and feeling, and in that realm it originates in the 
environment of noncognitive, timeless, existential personal encounter.85 
persona. It is not something objective. It is the objective, because it is the subjective, 
namely, God's subjective. God's word means God speaking" ( W ,  V1, 155). God's speech 
is equal to his eternal act, that is equal to who he is. In other words Barth is not 
contradicting himself when he talks about Dei loquentis persona because the loquentis is 
equal to his eternal act and does not belong to the level of history and therefore of reason, 
imagination, feeling, and action. 
83~ar th  imself explains that since "the Word of God is itself God's act," "it has no- 
thing to do with the general problem of historical understanding. Of course the question 
of some sort of historical understanding always arises when the Word of God is manifest 
to us in its contemporaneousness. But it is not that sort of historical understanding as such 
which signifies the hearing, and is the basis of the proclamation, of the Word of God. 
Where the Word of God is heard and proclaimed, something happens which in spite of 
all interpretative skill cannot be brought about by interpretative skill" ( W  V1, 168). 
84W I/2, 1; see 1-44. 
8 5 ~ n  his On Religion, Schleiermacher had already stated that the divine encounter 
"is not really a separate moment at all. The penetration of existence within this immediate 
union ceases as soon as it reaches consciousness. Then a vivid and clear perspective arises 
before you, like the image of an absent mistress in the eyes of her young lover; or feeling 
works its way out from deep within you and spreads over your whole being, like the 
blush of modesty and love over a young girl's face." He concludes "that what we have to 
do with here is beyond time and yet, precisely because of this, is rightly placed at the apex 
of dl things temporaln(87-88). 
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In the preceding section it has been shown that man has a passive 
capability to be acted upon by the timeless divine activity which 
grounds the personal encounter structure. 
The Content of Revelation 
Because in the liberal model the content of revelation is the 
noncognitive, divine-human encounter, it follows that no idea, informa- 
tion, or words are originated by the divine activity. The event of 
revelation communicates neither timeless nor temporal historical truths. 
The way in which this content is "translated" into historically 
conditioned ideas and words will be dealt with later on under the 
section on inspiration. But before we move on to consider the way in 
which the liberal model conceives the way in which Scripture was 
written down, it is necessary to consider whether the historical 
temporal existence of Jesus of Nazareth plays any role as source of 
biblical content or whether it is only the product of the religious 
imagination of the community. 
Otto criticizes Schleiermacher's position because he conceives 
Christ only "as the supreme divining subject, not as the object of 
divination par e~ceZ1ence."~~ Otto asks whether it would be possible to 
conceive Christ in harmony with Christianity's claim that in his own 
person he is "'holiness made manifest', that is, a person in whose being, 
life, and mode of living we realize of ourselves by 'intuition and feeling' 
the self-revealing power and presence of the Godhead."" Otto's proposal 
is worked out in Kantian terms. Against Schleiermacher Otto suggests 
that divination is not a universal faculty shared by every human being. 
Only some holy men and prophets have the capability to experience the 
numinous and express it in their own lives, acts, and words. In this way 
these men become objective revelations of holiness made manifest. We 
are able to recognize these men, notably Christ, as objective impressions 
of the numen on us because a priori, in our own inner consciousness, 
we possess an "element of cognition, comprehension, and valuation," 
namely, the category of the holy. Thus, the numinous "impression" 
made by Christ in us is not the result of every-day historical 
occurrekes but rather of the a priori category of the hdly which allows 
us to discover in the man Jesus' divination his objective experience of 
%3tto, B e  Idea of the Holy, 159. Otto defines divination as the faculty "of genuinely 
cognizing and recognizing the holy in its appearances" (ibid., 148). 
87~bid., 159. 
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the numinous." In this indirect sense, then, it could be said that Jesus 
is also the content of revelation. 
Brunner seems to go further than Otto. He boldly states that a 
person "in space and time, is himself the Word. The Word of God, 
because it is a personal word, is present as a person. This is what the 
Christian calls revelation; 'the Word was made flesh and we have seen 
his glory.'"" Yet, Brunner hastens to qualify this statement by warning 
us that the revelation of the Word in space and time is not direct and 
consequently should not be confused with "miraculous theophanies."" 
The revelation of the Word in space and time, explains Brunner, is 
indirect. "Thus the historical appearance of the human personality of 
Jesus is not, as such, revelation; it is revelation only in so far as in this 
historical, human personality the eternal Son of God is recognized. The 
incognito of his historical appearance can be pierced only by the eye of 
faith."91 It is difficult to see how either Otto's or Brunner's position 
could take the historical Jesus as a direct source of revelation. It seems 
that only the timeless, noncognitive existential divine-human encounter 
and its salvific experience is the content of revelation. 
Barth's articulation of the content of revelation is more elaborate. 
He certainly agrees that the existential encounter produced by the 
"Eternal Act of the Word" in man is the content of revelation to which 
the Bible writers are witnesses. As does Brunner, Barth also attempts to 
go beyond the existential encounter to include Christ as the content of 
revelation. Consequently, it is not infrequent to read statements to the 
effect that revelation is equal with Jesus Christ. For instance, early in 
his Church Dogmatics Barth affirms that "revelation in fact does not 
differ from the Person of Jesus Christ, and again does not differ from 
the reconciliation that took place in Him. To say revelation is to say, 
'The Word became flesh.'"92 
However, Barth also identifies Jesus Christ with the eternal 
nonhistorical act of God's Word which is the core of revelation as 
existential encounter.93 Here Barth works on the basis of the idea that 
89~runner, ?he Theology of Cisis, 34. 
?tbid., 34. 
'l~bid., 35. 
92~arth, W V1, 134. 
93~arth's cheme requires three levels of "time" or "history" to explain the phe- 
nomenon of the revelation of the Word of God in the man Jesus of Nazareth. First he 
speaks of God's own being as not timeless but rather "historical even in its eternity" (CD, 
Wl, 66). This "historicity" of God is conceived to be the very source of time (ibid., 67). 
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in its essence the act of revelation creates its external correspondent in 
the world of space and time. These external correspondents are called 
"signs." He points out that "among the signs of the objective reality of 
revelation we have to understand certain definite events and relations 
and orders within the world in which revelation is an objective reality, 
and therefore within the world which is also our world, the world of 
nature and history."94 In this way Barth explains the historical facts 
(fallen, historicist history) in Scripture including Israel's history, Jesus 
of Nazareth, and the Christian church.95 
Ontologically natural and historical phenomena become signs 
because they are chosen by the eternal act of God to play that role.% 
The historicist meaning of nature or history has nothing to do in the 
choosing. As a matter of fact, Barth clearly states that the whole of 
signs contained in biblical history "might equally well have been quite 
different."" Moreover, epistemologically, between the external sign 
(historicist time) and the internal reality of the Word of God (eternal 
time of God and grace) there can be only a correspondence of contradic- 
This historical eternity however is conceived by Barth as simultaneity, where the proper 
succession that belongs to the essence of time does not exist (ibid.; see the detailed 
discussion on God's eternity in W, II/1,608-677). On the contrary, simultaneity logically 
and traditionally describes the very essence of timelessness. Second, Barth speaks of the 
mutually corresponding times of creation and redemption (a, W l ,  75). This time is 
grounded in grace and "is constituted by God's own presence in Jesus Christ in the world 
created by Him" (ibid., 73). The description of this time of grace, the time of the incar- 
nation, is made by Barth in temporal terms that clearly assume the absence of temporal 
succession, that is, the time of the incarnation is still not time but eternity (ibid., 73-79. 
Finally, Barth speaks of "fallen time" that is our time. "It is the time whose flux has 
become a flight." Barth recognizes that this "is our only time" (ibid., 7). When Barth 
turns to the issue of historicity he affirms that the historicity of creation and grace is 
nonhistorical in the historicist sense. Historicist history is our real history in the order 
of succession. Creation, redemption, and therefore revelation occur in the nonhistorical 
part of what Barth also calls "prehistory." It seems clear, then, that the encounter of 
revelation and the act of the revelation in the incarnation of Jesus Christ belong to the 
nonhistorical side, closer to the eternal act of God. 
9 4 ~ ~  I/& 223. "The fact that God's revelation is also a sign-giving is one side, the 
objective side, as it were, of its subjective reality" (ibid., 224). 
9 6 ~ h e  ternal "choosing" is explained by Barth in the case of the historicist 
humanity of Jesus Christ as an eternal assumptio which amounts to an eternal adoptionism 
in which the historicist human nature of Jesus of Nazareth is assumed in the eternal act 
that God is (ibid., 155). In short, for Barth the Johannine egeneto amounts to the eternal 
adoption of the man Jesus of Nazareth (ibid., 159-171). By virtue of that adoption the 
historical Jesus can be the external form of the Word of God that remains always the 
same. 
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tion. Barth specifically clarifies that "the place where God's Word is 
manifest is, objectively and subjectively, the cosmos in which sin rules. 
The form of the Word of God is therefore really that of the cosmos 
which stands in contradiction to God. It as little has in it the capacity 
of revealing God to us as we on our part have the capacity for knowing 
God in it."98 
Here we face a clearly ontological and epistemological duality in 
the Platonic and Kantian traditions. In their being chosen by God the 
signs have a reality and meaning (eternal time, time of grace) different 
and contradictory to the reality and meaning that correspond to them 
in the real world of space and time.99 The duality between timelessness 
and temporality stems from Platonic tradition; the rejection of analogy 
between the two orders stems from the Kantian tradition. Truly, signs, 
including Scripture which is obviously a sign also, are sacraments whose 
meaning, always given, not by the external form, but by the internal, 
spiritual act of the Word of God, is always one and the same 
"iustif2catio or sanctificatio hornini~."'~ 
By way of conclusion on the content of revelation we can suggest 
that Barth clearly teaches that the ultimate content of Scripture is 
always the existential encounter produced, via sacrament, by the 
"Eternal Act of the Word of God." In that he agrees with the liberal 
model. On the ontological side, however, his conception of the omni- 
potence and sovereignty of the eternal act of God seems to suggest that 
biblical writers were also given by God some "signs" or "forms" in 
historicist history. These could be considered as "content" of revelation, 
though of a different and lower kind that the real revelation in the 
Word. These signs basically would include the history of Israel and the 
life of Jesus of Nazareth. From the epistemological point of view, 
however, the one in which this article is interested, Barth's explanation 
that God assumed the historicist history of the sign, which is worked 
out not by him directly, but by the human agent, seems to suggest that 
biblical authors were able to identify God's signs, the external form of 
his Word, only on the basis of their personal noncognitive encounter 
with God. Either way it seems that Barth has made an effort to suggest 
that the content of revelation attested by the biblical writers also 
includes natural and historical phenomena chosen by God, mainly the 
history of Israel and the life of Jesus Christ. Yet because of his clear 
emphasis that the real content of revelation consists not in its external 
lW1bid., 230; see also 228-232. 
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form (sign) but rather in the noncognitive, nonhistorical existential 
encounter in which God meets human beings, Barth evidently works 
within the liberal model of revelation-inspiration. 
It seems clear that according to the liberal model. the ideas, 
information, concepts, and data we find in Scripture have been 
epistemologically originated by human cognitive activity without any 
contribution from God. The entire contents of Scripture, then, are 
human and historically conditioned. Thus, the liberal model of 
revelation juxtaposes the divine and the human in such a way that the 
contact between them does not involve any direct communication of 
truth or information, but rather provides an indirect stimulus to write 
(within historical limitations) abdut that which properly belongs to the 
timeless level of reality, namely, God and the religious experience. 
The liberal model includes a variety of submodels which identify 
revelation with a specific kind of divine activity;lol yet, these submodels 
always work within the parameters drawn by the liberal model of 
revelation. Thus, Avery Dulles' classification of models of revelation- 
"Revelation as History," "Revelation as Inner Experience," "Revelation 
as Dialectical Presence," and "Revelation as New Awarenessn-appears 
to set forth variations or submodels of the liberal model.lo2 
3. Inspiration in the Liberal Model 
The liberal model maintains that the process of writing down 
Scriptures is essentially "an exclusively human activity."lo3 The human 
writer of Scripture worked only with historically conditioned contents. 
No special divine charism is claimed to have assisted biblical writers. 
However, there is a way in which this model traces religious discourse 
back to God: The inner timeless encounter of absolute dependence is 
considered to be the ultimate cause that motivates the origination of all 
religious discourse, including, of course, the Bible. 
Schleiermacher connects the feeling of absolute dependence with 
the origin of biblical and dogmatic writings by claiming that human self 
-consciousness includes two inseparable, interconnected levels, one 
sensible and the other absolute. Consequently, he speaks of an absolute 
'Ol~or the existence of Merent levels of models and paradigms, see, e.g., Kiing, 134- 
135. 
lo2Dulles, Models, 53-114; see also 27. 
'03~ix, 456; see also Nash, 375, and Gordon Lewis, "The Human Authorship of 
Inspired Scripture," in Inwrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 19801, 
23 1-233. 
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and a sensible self-consciousness or feeling.lo4. Absolute self-conscious- 
ness is able "to manifest itself in time, by entering into relation with the 
sensible self-consciousness so as to constitute a moment."105 Thus, since 
within human self-consciousness the feeling of absolute dependence 
(originated by a timeless God) always co-occurs with feelings of pleasure 
and pain (originated by sensory temporal experiences), the feeling of 
absolute dependence is always linked to the content of the sensible self- 
consciousness through which it expresses itself. In the very instant of its 
origination, this content becomes the content of its external historical 
manifestation, and when the feeling of absolute dependence is linked to 
it, the result is emotion.lo6 Even when emotions express the feeling of - 
absolute dependence, they are not knowledge, however, for they belong 
to the precognitive level of inner self-consciousness. Consequently, the 
writing down of religious literature becomes "the attempt to translate 
the inward emotions into Biblical teachings, and Christian 
doctrines as well, are "nothing but the expressions given to the 
Christian self-consciousness and its conne~ions."'~~ 
As we have already pointed out, Otto, following Schleiermacher's 
lead, speaks of a human faculty of divination that allows some to 
gennuinely cognize and recognize "the holy in its appearances."lo9 These 
cognitions, however, are not identified with rational knowledge but 
rather with intuitions of the eternal beyond the temporal, which "in 
turn, assume shape in definite statements and propositions, capable of 
a certain groping formulation, which are not without analogy with. 
theoretic propositions, but are to be clearly distinguished from them by 
their free and merely felt, not reasoned, character."l1° 
The process of writing down the existential content of revelation 
is for Buber a process of translation or transmutation between two 
incompatible orders, the "I-Thou" order of the eternal encounter and 
the "I-It" order of spatio-temporal objectivity and know1edge.l" 
104~chleiermacher, The Christiarr Faith, 5, 4-5. 
lo71bid., § 13, postscript. 
'081bid. See also § 16, postscript. 
lo90tto, l%e Idea of the Holy, 148. 
'''The writer needs "to grasp as an object that which he has seen with the force of 
presence, he will have to compare it with objects, establish it in its order among classes 
of objects, describe and analyze it objectively. Only as It can it enter the structure of 
knowledge" (Buber, I and Thou, 40). 
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Brunner explicitly rejects the classical theory of verbal 
inspiration.l12 However, he explicitly affirms the guidance of the Holy 
Spirit on the Bible writers (inspiration) but in a way that does not rule 
out "human search, human weakness, and the possibility of mistakes in 
action and in behavior."l13 The real problem, however, in Brunner's 
doctrine of inspiration is determined by his previously formulated 
concept of revelation as a timeless, nonhistorical, noncognitive 
existential encounter within the "I-Thou" order. After such an 
encounter the Bible writer "speaks about God, about his Lord, Christ; 
God is now the Object of his pro~lamation."~~~ Clearly following the 
same general pattern established by Buber, Brunner claims that the 
written "word of the Apostle through preaching stands, as mediator, 
between the 'Thou-word' through which he became an Apostle, and the 
'Thou-word' through which the 'other' becomes a believer, through 
which the Christian community, the Church, comes into being."l15 
Obviously this same structure applies to the written word in Scripture. 
The written word is the It that as a sacrament mediates between the 
two divine actions in the apostle and the believer. The content, of 
course, comes from the Eternal 75ou of God and not from the written 
form or content of the It order of human language. 
Barth also clearly rejects the seventeenth-century doctrine of 
inspiration "as false doctrine."l16 The process by which Scripture was 
written is conceived to be a purely human process of "witnessing to 
revelation."l17 As witnesses to revelation, human authors created by 
their own agency the formal, temporal, external, cognitive "correspon- 
dent" or "written sign" to the eternal spiritual existential noncognitive 
Act of the Word of God.l18 The human element does not cease to be 
lt2~runner, Revelation and Rmm, 127- 130. 
118"~t is quite impossible that there should be a direct identity between the human 
word of Holy Scripture and the Word of God, and therefore between the creaturely 
reality in itself and as such and the reality of God the Creator. It is impossible that there 
should have been a transmutation of the one into the other or an admixture of the one 
with the other. This is not the case even in the person of Christ where the identity 
between God and man, in all the originality and indissolubility in which it confronts us, 
is an assumed identity" (CD V 2 ,  499). Barth goes on to draw an analogy between the 
incarnation of the Word in the humanity of Christ and the humanity of Scripture (ibid., 
500-501). As discussed earlier in this article, in both cases the human part is eternally 
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human, as well as fully and totally historically conditioned.l19 It 
necessarily follows that errors are contained in Scripture.120 
As we already pointed out, the content of revelation according to 
Barth consists in the internal, timeless, nonhistorical, "Eternal Act of 
His Word" and the external correspondent of historical and natural 
signs, including the history of Israel and the life of Jesus of Nazareth, 
willed and assumed in the very self-same act. It is easy to see how 
biblical writers acting within their natural and therefore fallible 
cognitive capacities may have gathered historical information from their 
own witnessing of facts or through a process of oral or written 
tradition. Yet, were they also able to talk about the real content of 
revelation, the nonhistorical, noncognitive encounter with the Word of 
God? Barth answers in the affirmative. The activity of speaking about 
the Word of God is characterized, in good liberal terms, as divination, 
while the language produced by divination is characterized as saga. 
Thus, divination is the cognitive process by which the unaided human 
intuition attempts to translate the timeless existential content of the 
encounter into the contradictory realm of time and space thus 
~roducing a written account under the category of saga (poetry).121 It 
chosen, assumed, or adopted by God's eternal decision. Ontologically, then, it can be said 
that God is the ultimate cause of the external form or sign. Epistemologically, though, 
that is regarding its actual content and meaning, it is entirely caused by the temporal, 
historical, historicist nature of the human being and reason. For a discussion of Barth's 
analogy between Christ and Scripture, see Frank Hasel, "The Christological Analogy of 
Scripture in Karl Barth," 72 50 (1994): 41-49. 
l19Talking about the human authors of Scripture, Barth remarks that "their action 
was their own, and like every human action, an act conditioned by and itself conditioning 
its temporal and spatial environment" (W V2, 505). "Not only part but all that they say 
is historically related and conditioned" (ibid., 509). 
120~rophets and apostles "even in their office, even in their function as witnesses, 
even in the act of writing down their witness, were real, historical men as we are, and 
therefore sinful in their action, and capable and actually guilty of error in their spoken 
and written word" (ibid., 529). 
l2'~egarding the nature of human language about the objective revelation produced 
by the Word of God, Barth argues the "in addition to the 'historical' there has always 
been a legitimate 'non-historical' and view of history, and its 'non-historical' 
and pre-historical depiction in the form of saga" (W, W l ,  81). Saga is clearly defined as 
"an intuitive and poetic picture of a prehistorical reality of history which is enacted once 
and for all within the confines of time and space" (ibid.). The cognitive process by which 
the intuitive translation of the nonhistorical to the historical is understood by Barth as 
divination, which "means the vision of the historical emergence which precedes 'historical' 
events and which can be guessed from that which has emerged and in which 'historical' 
history takes place" (ibid., 83). In short, divination "looks to the basic and impelling 
occurrence behind the everyday aspect of history, where the latter is not only no less 
history than on this everyday aspect but has indeed its source and is to that extent history 
in a hgher sense" (ibid.). 
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should be remembered (1) that such a translation is made between 
incompatible nonanalogical levels, and (2) that in the first level we not 
only have no space and time but also no knowledge as we know it, and 
(3) that the intuition and linguistic expression is made by fallen men 
without any supernatural aid.lu According to Barth, then, Scripture is 
a humanly conceived and ~roduced document which generally is a mix- 
ture of history and saga, with some exceptional occurrence of either 
pure saga (as in the creation accounts) or pure h i ~ t 0 r y . l ~ ~  No divinely 
originated cognitive contents are to be found in the whole of Scripture. 
Scripture itself is one of the many external historical signs that God uses 
sacramentally, in connection with which God may choose to produce 
the existential encounter in the be1ie~er.l~~ 
Finally, if inspiration may still refer to a divine influence on the 
writing of Scripture, the liberal model, following Schleiermacher's lead, 
seems to favor a switch regarding the locus where such activity might 
be recognized from the individual to the social l e ~ e 1 . l ~ ~  Accordingly, 
inspiration would work, not on the writers, but rather on the entire 
community that historically conditions the contents of emotions, 
knowledge, and words utilized by these writers. This "socialn view of 
inspiration, however, does not change the fact that the epistemological 
origin of Scripture is human. 
It is possible to say, then, that the liberal model of inspiration has 
no place for direct divine activity in the cognitive-linguistic process of 
writing Scripture. The writing of Scripture was achieved by the power 
of human imagination, which replaces reason. In essence, moreover, the 
process of writing Scripture was historical and therefore fallible and 
limited.126 Borrowing the terms utilized by the classical model, it is 
possible to suggest that according to the liberal model the reach of 
human activity in the writing of Scripture is full and plenary. By the 
same token the divine activity seems to be eliminated fully and 
completely. 
122That is why Barth comments that divination "looks to the point where from the 
standpoint of 'history' everything is dark, although in fact it is only from this point that 
'history' can emerge and be clear" (ibid., 83). 
12%ee The Christian Faith, 5 130. 
126~onsequently, the liberal model of revelation-inspiration allows for errors to be 
found not only in biblical expressions but also in biblical teachings. Moreover, the task 
of theology includes the discovering and elimination of such errors. 
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4 .  Implications for Theology 
A study of the far-reaching implications of the acceptance of the 
liberal model of revelation-inspiration for the constitution of Christian 
theology cannot be probed in-this article. But the importance of such 
a study cannot be understated, since the liberal model seems to have 
been accepted in the theological circles of a vast majority of Christian 
den0minati0ns.l~~ Therefore, it is appropriate to outline some of the 
results of applying the liberal model of revelation-inspiration to Scrip- 
ture as the source of theological data in order to have a better under- 
standing of the full theological significance of this model. First of all, it 
should be noticed that since according to the liberal model the contents 
and words of Scripture are not produced by human reason but by 
human imagination,12' Christian theology is left without objective cogni- 
tive foundations. Theological pluralism becomes an unavoidable result 
of the liberal model of revelation-in~pirati0n.l~~ Second, since biblical 
words and meanings are wholly human, biblical exegesis is to be under- 
taken with the same tools and procedures utilized by the historical and 
literary sciences.130 Third, liberal theology has felt free to play, so to 
speak, with the biblical contents in their possible role as sources of 
theology, which are processed mainly under two basic categories: his- 
tory and literature. Because the content of theology in the liberal model 
is not historical but rather transcendent and timeless, such play has no 
direct bearing on the constitution and determination of the contents of 
Christian theology. And fourth, philosophy, science, tradition, and 
experience are called by the liberal model to play a grounding role as 
sources of theology, a role that properly belongs to Scripture. 
5 .  Conclusion 
In my previous article the classical model was explored. In this one, 
with the description of the most common general features of the liberal 
127~ts outreach is said to include, among others, Roman Catholicism (Schijkel, 218) 
and most Southern Baptist seminaries and colleges (Nash, 34). Gordon Lewis has studied 
the case of Berkouwer, who began with the classical model of revelation-inspiration, but 
later switched to the liberal model (236). This case should not be considered an isolated 
one, however. 
'*'The role of imagination in the constitution of theology has been given extensive 
analytical and technical consideration in David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: 
Christian Beology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 198 1). 
129See Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, $ 10, postscript. 
130see ibid., S 27, 3, and S 130, 2. 
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model, we have completed our historical journey in search of the general 
characteristics of the models by which the explanation of the epistemological 
origin of Scripture has been formulated throughout the history of Christian 
theology. As the reader may have noticed, my purpose was not and is not 
to criticize either model. It is my personal opinion that one has to recognize 
that both models have been developed with a high degree of inner 
coherence and that both are theoretically possible. The purpose for 
describing both the classical and liberal models was to provide the necessary 
context to help us to see whether a proper explanation of the epistemo- 
logical origin of Scripture may require a new model or whether Christian 
theology can still attempt its proper task by utilizing various versions of the 
existing models. 
~ i o m  the brief analytical description of the classical and liberal models 
of revelation and inspiration, it seems possible to draw at least the following 
general conclusions: 
First, as the consequences of both models are briefly considered it 
becomes apparent that great portions of Scripture (classical model) or the 
whole content of Scripture (liberal model) are rendered practically irrelevant 
as sources of theology. Thus, Christian theology is driven to draw the 
contents for its doctrines more from science, philosophy, experience, and 
tradition than from Scripture. Only when inspiration is understood as 
revelation in the classical model or, to put it in another way, when in the 
classical model inspiration is disconnected from the doctrine of revelation, 
the whole of Scripture becomes theoretically authoritative as a source of 
theology in its entirety. 
Second, the formulation of the liberal model of inspiration and 
revelation was required by epistemological changes produced within the 
presuppositional framework that contradicted the presuppositions utilized 
by the classical model. Accordingly, human consciousness came to be 
conceived as limited to the historical realm, and therefore, unable to have 
cognitive contact with a nonhistorical, nontemporal reality, namely God. 
Third, both models seem to have difficulties integrating the two main 
types of data that should be accounted for in any doctrine of revelation- 
inspiration. These main types of data are (1) what Scripture says about itself 
(biblical doctrine about itself) and (2) what Scripture is (phenomena of 
Scripture). The classical model seems to have difficulties in properly 
accounting for the phenomena of Scripture, while the liberal model appears 
to find greater difficulty in following what Scripture says about itself. 
Fourth, both models seem to be incapable of providing an explanation 
of the epistemological origin of Scripture in which both the divine and the 
human agencies are properly recognized in their spec& contributions to the 
constitution of biblical contents and words. Again, the classical model has 
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difficulties accounting for the contributions of the human agency while the 
liberal model is unable to properly include the divine as depicted in 
Scripture. 
Fifth, it seems clear that the difficulties presented so far are the result 
of the presuppositional structure on which these models are built. The 
common denominator shared by these two models comes into view when 
their conviction that God's nature and activities are to be interpreted as 
timeless is uncovered. The analysis of these two models, then, seems to 
indicate that a timeless interpretation of the divine being and its activity is 
the structural cause of the shortcomings each model appears unable to 
overcome. 
Sixth, the reason why both models follow a timeless interpretation of 
God lies in the fact that neither of them follow the methodological principle 
of soh Scriptura but rather build their views utilizing extrabiblical 
philosophical principles and methodologies. 
Finally, in their departure from the soh Scriptura principle, both 
models follow a procedure that is essentially unscientific. A methodology 
that interprets an object according to categories that are alien to it seems to 
ignore the basic scientific principle according to which any object of 
scientific inquiry should be allowed to express itself freely and fully. A 
scientific approach to the study of the epistemological origin of Scripture, 
then, can neither follow the classical nor liberal models of revelation- 
inspiration because they apply to the object of study presuppositions that 
are alien to it. A scientific approach to the investigation of the 
epistemological origin of Scripture should be built on the basis of a total 
commitment to the soh Scriptura principle from which both the 
presuppositional structure and the data for a new model of revelation and 
inspiration must flow. 
These brief suggestions regarding the common characteristics shared by 
the classical and liberal models of revelation-inspiration seem to indicate the 
necessity not only for the formulation of a new model, but also, once it is 
built, that its theological consequences be followed. Such a new model 
should be built on the basis of the biblical ground uncovered in my first 
article and following the methodology discussed in the second. Once the 
possibility, methodology, and need for the development of a new model of 
revelation and inspiration have been explored, we may dedicate attention to 
the actual formulation of the basic structure of the new model. Later will 
come the actual development of a fullfledged theory of revelation and 
inspiration that may discuss in a detailed way all the issues that are, in one 
way or another, related to the epistemological origin of Scripture. 
